International Aspects of German Estate Law by Coester, Michael
International Aspects of German
Estate Law
MICHAEL COESTER*
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN CASES OF SUCCESSION
A. Sources of Private International Law
German conflicts of law rules are codified in the Introductory
Law to the BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch (EGBGB) of 1896.1 This stat-
ute gives a very incomplete picture of private international law in
action. Some rules have been superseded by international conven-
tions; others have been supplemented and modified by court rulings
and legal scholars. 2 The Treaty of Friendship of 19543 between the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany has little effect
on the conflict rules on succession.4
Because the Introductory Law is not only incomplete, but
largely anachronistic, discussion about its reform has been in pro-
gress for many years. The German Council on Private International
Law has recently published proposals for a reform of private inter-
national law in the field of succession.5 Further, several bills for a
completely new private international law have been introduced.6
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1. EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ ZUM BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH (1896) [hereinafter cited
as EGBGB]. For an English translation of the statute see U. DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GER-
MAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (1972) [hereinafter cited as DROBNIG].
2. For the role of case law and legal scholarship in Germany, see DROBNIG, supra note
1, at 47-55.
3. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States of America of October 29, 1954, effective July 14, 1956,
BUNDESGESETZBLATr [BGB1] II 763 (1956).
4. For the impact of the Treaty on German-American estate law, cf. DROBNIG, supra
note 1, at 154, 171, 182, 193.
5. VORSCHLAGE UND GUTACHTEN ZUR REFORM DES DEUTSCHEN INTERNATIONALEN
ERBRECHTS (W. Lauterbach ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as VORSCHLAGE].
6. KOHNE, IPR-GESETZENTWURF (Heidelberg 1980); Neuhaus/Kropholler, Entwurf
eines Gesetzes aber internationales Privat- und Verfahrensrechl (IPR-Gesetz), 44 RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELS Z.] 326
(1980); for a discussion see Henrich, in PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND
VERFAHRENSRECHT 2-4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as IPRax]. New statutes on conflict of laws
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However, at the moment, it is not foreseeable if, when, and to what
extent Germany will promulgate a new private international law.
Several obstacles have prevented the new law from coming into
existence, such as the absence of lobbying in Parliament, the lack of
experts in legislative committees, the great.number of "quarreling"
experts at the universities, and finally, the necessity for intra-Euro-
pean coordination. Consequently, the present private international
law will probably remain in effect. In order to ascertain this law,
court decisions and scholarly writings, rather than the EGBGB,
should be consulted.
B. The General Conflict Rules on Succession
1. Law of succession (lex hereditatis)
In German law, the principle of unity of succession has resulted
in the adoption of the same succession law for movables and im-
movables. This law will be referred to in the following discussion as
the "law of succession" or the "lex hereditatis."
2. The national law of the decedent as lex hereditatis
a. The nationality principle
The general rule derived from articles 24 and 25 EGBGB is
that the national law of the decedent at the time of his death governs
the devolution of his property. 7 If the decedent has no nationality,
the law of his last habitual residence or of his last residence applies.8
Problems arise if the decedent has two or more nationalities. If
all of them are foreign, German courts will ask for the "most effec-
tive nationality," i.e., the nationality of the state with which the de-
cedent has had the closest connection. 9 According to the modern
prevailing view, the law of the "most effective nationality" will gov-
have been enacted in Austria (1978) and East Germany (1975). Switzerland has also pub-
lished the draft of a new statute.
7. Judgment of May 2, 1966 (Bundesgerichtshof) [BGH], 45 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 351; judgment of April 5, 1968 (BGH), 50
BGHZ 63, 64.
8. For stateless persons see art. 29 EGBGB. Article 12 I of the Protocol relates to the
status of refugees. Law of Jan. 31, 1967, BGBI 11 1294 (1967).
9. GUTACHTEN ZUM INTERNATIONALEN UND AUSLNDISCHEN PRIVATRECHT 698, no.
66 (K. Zweigert, G. Kegel & M. Ferid ed. 1967/1968) [hereinafter cited as IPG]; G. KEGEL,
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 202 (4th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as KEGELJ; PALANDT/
HELDRICH, BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, n.7(a) preceding art. 7 EGBGB [hereinafter cited
as PALANDT/HELDRICH].
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ern, even if one of the nationalities is German. I0 But according to
the traditional view which is often applied by the courts, German
law controls.
The nationality test fails where there is no single system of law
for an entire country. For example, in the United States, each state
determines its own laws of succession, which requires that the Ger-
man court first ascertain the appropriate forum within the United
States. Some courts have applied the German interstate principle
and looked to the decedent's last habitual residence."I Other courts
have applied the rules of domicile as defined by American law, be it
the domicile under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution,
as interpreted by the United States federal courts,' 2 or the domicile
concept of the common law.1 3 In many decisions, it is not clear
whether the terms "domicile" and "residence" are to be interpreted
according to the German or American concept.' 4 However, uncer-
tainty on this point does not seem to cause any real practical
difficulties.
b. Exceptions to the nationality principle
i. liability for debts of the decedent: article 24 II EGBGB
Pursuant to article 24 II EGBGB, a decedent's heirs may
choose between the decedent's domiciliary law and his national law
in determining liability for his debts outstanding at the time of
death. For example, the heirs of a German whose domicile at death
was the state of New York may invoke New York law, thereby lim-
iting their liability to the estate if an administration occurs. A renvoi
(a reference by the laws of one country to the laws of another na-
tion) will be accepted.15 Article 24 II EGBGB is of little practical
10. Fenid, Zur kollisionsrechtlichen Behandlung Pon Inlandern mit zugleich auslindischer
Staatsangehdrigkeit, 23 RABELS Z. 498 (1958); judgment of June 20, 1979 (BGH), IPRax,
supra note 6, at 25 (1981); cf. judgment of May 21, 1974 (Bundesverfassungs-gericht), ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE FAMILIENRECHT [FAM. R. Z.] 579, 586 (1974); Firsching,
IPRax 14-16 (1981).
11. IPG, supra note 9, at 683, no. 65 (1967/1968); IPG 352, no. 36 (1971); IPG 218, no.
22 (1974).
12. IPG, supra note 9, at 698, no. 61 (1965/1966); IPG 338, no. 34 (1972).
13. IPG, supra note 9, at 711, no. 62 (1965/1966).
14. Judgment of Apr. 15, 1959 (BGH), 12 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN-ZEITSCHRIFT
[N.J.W.] 1317 (1959); cf. IPG 351, no. 36 (1971) and IPG 218, no. 22 (1974).
15. PALANDT/HELDRICH, supra note 9, art. 24 n.4. The effect of art. 24 11 EGBGB will
be substantially weakened in German-American relations by way of renvoi, if the liability
for debts of the decedent is classified as a matter of administration under the United States
law combined with an assumed American conflicts rule, which refers all matters of adminis-
1981]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J[
significance and will be eliminated in an upcoming revision of the
statute. 16
ii. privilegium germanicum: article 25 sentence 2 EGBGB
If the decedent had a foreign nationality, but his last domicile
was in Germany, German claimants to his estate could invoke the
German law of succession instead of the national law of the dece-
dent, unless this law would submit the estate of a German exclu-
sively to German law. The purpose of this outmoded provision 7 is
"retaliation" against states which follow the domicile principle
rather than the principle of nationality in private international law.
The provision is, therefore, generally applicable to the determina-
tion of the succession of United States citizens who die domiciled in
Germany. "Domicile," in this context, has to be interpreted accord-
ing to German law.18 Since German law accepts the renvoi by
United States law to the domiciliary law of the decedent with regard
to movables,' 9 article 25 sentence 2 EGBGB applies only where an
American national with his last domicile in Germany (according to
German law) has died while retaining United States domicile ac-
cording to American law.20
iii. Lex situs: article 28 EGBGB
In deference to the law of the state in which some of the dece-
dent's property is located, article 28 EGBGB provides that if parts
of the property, movable or immovable, are located in a state whose
law does not govern the entire succession, "special provisions" may
nonetheless control the disposition of some of the property. Al-
though it is somewhat of an ambiguous term, "special provisions"
include feudal rules governing the devolution of family property or
tration to the lex situs. M. FERID & K. FIRSCHING, 5 INTERNATIONALES ERBRECHT USA
40/160 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FERID/FIRSCHING].
16. Feid, Das internationale gesetzliche Erbrecht, in VORSCHLAGE, supra note 5, at 20,
24 [hereinafter cited as Fenid, VORSCHLAGE].
17. It has raised unanimous criticism and should be discarded in the future. Id. at 24.
18. Judgment of Dec. 21, 1955 (BGH), 19 BGHZ 315, 316. According to German and
Swiss law, a person can have more than one domicile (Wohnsitz), in contrast to American
law.
19. Domicile, for the purpose of renvoi, will be determined according to United States
law.
20. Cf. DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 159. This may happen because the German test for
"domicile" is less strict than the American concept.
[Vol. 4
International Aspects
the inheritance of farms.2' Such special provisions do not cover
other kinds of property which are more "international" in nature,
where there is no need for anything other than unified national
treatment. Since individual states have no special interest in having
their own law applied in such cases, it is argued that article 28
EGBGB should not be interpreted to command the application of
the lex situS.22
Following the prevailing view, the courts extend article 28
EGBGB to special confficts rules which have no counterpart in the
internal law of the state of the situs. 23 Thus, if a German decedent
leaves immovable property in the United States, the law of the
American state in question will govern the succession of these im-
movables, while German law (as the national law of the decedent)
will apply to the succession in all other aspects.
iv. renvoi: article 27 EGBGB
By far the most important exception to the nationality principle
is the broad admission of renvoi in German law. The reference to
the decedent's national law in articles 24 and 25 EGBGB includes
the conflict rules of that country. Hence, a remission (reference to
the decedent's national law) or transmission (reference to the laws of
a third country) contained in such rules will be respected.24 The
renvoi is especially important for German-American succession
cases. In such cases, the national law of a decedent, as interpreted
21. Judgment of July 14, 1965 (BGH), I NACHSCHLAGEWERK DES BUNDES-GERICHT-
SHOFS [LM] on art. 28 EGBGB.
22. L. RAAPE & F. STURM, 1 INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 185 et. seq. (6th ed.
1977) [hereinafter cited as RAAPE/STURM]. Article 28 was primarily designed to give effect
to the internal (substantive) law of the state where the property was situated, but only if this
law embodied special, exceptional provisions for this type of property as distinguished from
the regular rules governing "normal" property. Historically, if a state had such special sub-
stantive provisions, it also had corresponding provisions on the conffict-of-laws level, treat-
ing this special type of property differently from "normal" property (usually subjecting it to
the state's own substantive law regardless of the regular conflict rules). Over the centuries,
in the course of social and legal reforms, the special treatment of certain types of property in
the internal/substantive law may have been eliminated, but the corresponding conflicts rules,
have persisted as relicts of former times. The American conflicts rules subjecting immov-
ables to the lex situs are interpreted in this sense by some German authors.
23. Judgment of Apr. 5, 1968 (BGH), 50 BGHZ 63, 68; M. FERID, INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT no. 3- 135 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FERID]; Ferid, VORSCHLAGE, supra note
16, at 36; P. NEUHAUS, DIE GRUNDBEGRIFFE DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS 292
(2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as NEUHAUS].
24. Judgment of Nov. 21, 1953 (BGH), 28 BGHZ 375, 380.
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by German courts, refers to the domiciliary law for movables25 or to
the lex situs for immovables.2 6 If this means a renvoi to German law
(where the decedent's last domicile or the last situs of real property
was Germany), the remission refers exclusively to German substan-
tive law, and not to the German conflict rules.27 In order to avoid
an international ping-pong match between the conflict systems, Ger-
man substantive law will be the law of the succession, if the national
law of the decedent refers back to German law.28 Since renvoi may
cause abandonment of the German principle of unity-of-succession,
arguments have been advanced in favor of a double-renvoi, (refer-
ence by the country to which the original reference was made to the
national law),29 but so far with little success.
The doctrine of renvoi in German law causes problems of clas-
sification. While in general, legal questions are to be classified ac-
cording to the German lexfori,30 questions arising in the context of
foreign law will be classified in accordance with the lex causae.31 In
applying the conflicts law of a given American state, German courts
will, for instance, look to that state's concept of domicile. However,
this is not true with regard to the question of whether certain prop-
erty is movable or immovable. The laws of the American states
seem to refer this question of classification to the lex situs, 32 so that
25. Judgment of Apr. 15, 1959 (BGH), WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN [WM] 662 (1959).
26. Judgment of June 5, 1957 (BGH), 24 BGHZ 352, 355; DIE DEUTSCHE RECHT-
SPRECHUNG AUF DEM GEBIET DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS 469, no. 146 (1956/
1957) [IPRspr.]; Neuhaus/Guindisch, Gemeinschaftliche Testamente Amerikanischer Er-
blasser, 21 RABELS Z. 550, 564 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Neuhaus/Gtlndisch].
27. See cases cited supra notes 25, 26.
28. The German law was stated correctly in Estate of Strauss, 347 N.Y.S. 2d 840, 844
(Supr. Ct. 1973).
29. IPG, supra note 9, at 685, no. 65 (1967/1968); IPG 354, no. 36, n.3 (1971). The
double-renvoi was considered where it was perfectly clear that the foreign national law
would accept it and would apply its own substantive rules of succession. See judgment of
Jan. 15, 1974 (Amtsgericht Mtinchen), IPRspr., supra note 26, at no. 130 (1974) (the decision
refers to Israeli law). United States law differs in this respect. Sometimes the effects of a
double-renvoi are reached by overlooking the primary renvoi of the United States law. See
judgment of Oct. 26, 1961 (BGH), 49 BGHZ 1, 2 (1961).
30. Judgment of Dec. 19, 1958 (BGH), 29 BGHZ 139 (1958).
31. Judgment of Apr. 15, 1959 (BGH) WM 662, 663 (1959); NEUHAUS, supra note 23,
at 123; FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/183; IPG, supra note 9, at 685, no. 65 (1967/
1968).
32. Judgment of June 5, 1957 (BGH), 24 BGHZ 352, 355 (1957), supra note 26, at
IPRspr. no. 146 (1956/1957). For further references see supra note 26. This interpretation
of the United States law seems to be too broad. The remission of the classification problem
is rather a means of avoiding conflicts with the situs-state which might possibly consider the
property as movable and, therefore, from an American point of view, is subject to its own
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German courts, regrettably, have to draw a distinction which is un-
known in German private international law. If the property in
question is land, the classification is easy. 33 But difficulties arise if
the property consists of mortgages, 34 company shares, 35 or institu-
tions of German law unknown to Americans, like a spouse's right
upon the dissolution of the marriage to a share of the savings ac-
quired by the other during the marriage. German courts attempt to
resolve the problem by applying domestic, dogmatic concepts of
classification which appear scarcely suitable for international pur-
poses. The only assistance to the courts is a guideline of the Federal
Supreme Court stating that, in order to preserve the endangered
unity-of-succession, property rights should preferably be classified
as movable. 36 A more functional approach to the problem of classi-
fication has been suggested, 37 but has not yet adopted by the courts.
The consequence of a partial renvoi with regard to immovables
situated in Germany is the effective splitting of the estate into two
separate parts, one governed by the law of an American state, the
other by German law as the lex situs. Each part of the estate is
treated (by the German courts) as a separate unit.38 Thus, creditors
of the estate cannot be foreclosed by a final probate decree rendered
in the domiciliary state with regard to the immovable estate in Ger-
many; they must observe the formalities prescribed by German
law.3
9
Further, a will which is invalid under the law of the domiciliary
state of the American decedent, but valid according to German law,
law. The remission of the classification system is not necessary. Property is "movable" only
if none of the interested states claim it as "immovable." Smith, Classrfcation by the Site in
the Conflict of Laws, 26 MOD. L. REv. 16, 33 (1963); NEUHAUS, supra note 23, at 124.
33. It is doubtful that in this case the American law leaves any room for classification
by the lex situs. Cf. Jayme, Zur Quaiftkationsverweisung im internationalen Privatrecht, 17
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG [Z. F. RVGL.] 93, 104 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Jayme].
34. Mortgages are classified as "movable" by the prevailing view in Germany, FERID,
supra note 23, at no. 3-98. For a different view, see judgment of Feb. 1, 1952 (BGH), 5 N. J.
W. 420 (1952).
35. Company shares are "movable", even if the assets of the company consist largely
of real property. Judgment of June 5, 1957 (BGH), 24 BGHZ 352, 355.
36. Id.
37. With regard to classification in general, see NEUHAUS, supra note 23, at 129 et seq.
38. Judgment of June 5, 1957 (BGH), 24 BGHZ 352, 355.
39. Judgment of Sept. 25, 1958 (Landgericht Kassel), IPRspr., supra note 26, at no. 146
(1958/1959).
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can be upheld with regard to German immovables. 40
3. Summary
With respect to American-German relations, the general posi-
tion of the German private international law of succession may be
summarized as follows:41
(1) The personal property of an American decedent is gov-
erned by the law of his last domicile, which is determined according
to the American domiciliary concept. His immovable property is
governed by the lex situs; German law by way of renvoi determines
whether the property is immovable. As an exception, if at the time
of his death the American decedent was domiciled in Germany, ac-
cording to German but not American law, the inheritance rights of
German claimants to the estate will be determined according to
German law.
(2) The estate of a German decedent is governed by German
law. However, the courts have to apply the American law of the
situs to immovable property situated in the United States.
C Limits to the Lex Hereditatis
The lex hereditatis does not extend to all questions which might
arise in connection with the distribution of a decedent's estate.
1. Preliminary questions
There is no unanimous view in Germany on preliminary ques-
tions such as marital status or legitimacy. The prevailing practice
determines such questions independently of the lex causae, accord-
ing to general German confficts rules. 42 This method, which seems
to be followed by most of the United States courts also, guarantees
the harmony of decisions on the national level at the expense of
international harmony.
The opponents of this practice 43 argue, not without reason, that
where German conffict rules refer to a foreign law, this law should
be applied as a whole in the same way as foreign courts would apply
40. Judgment of May 6, 1930 (Oberlandesgericht Dresden), IPRspr., supra note 26, at
no. 95 (1931).
41. DROBNIG, .rupra note 1, at 161.
42. Judgment of Apr. 5, 1968 (BGH), 50 BGHZ 63, 70; RAAPE/STURM, supra note 22,
at 290.
43. Judgment of Jan. 18, 1960 (Kammergericht), IPRspr., supra note 26, at no. 137
(1960/1961); RAAPE/STURM, supra note 22, at 289 n.17-28.
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it, thereby assuring international uniformity of decisions. The de-
termination of preliminary questions according to the lex causae
fails where international uniformity has been disregarded at an ear-
lier stage. For example, the marriage between a Greek and a Ger-
man, consummated in Germany before the registrar as prescribed
by German law, will be held valid in Germany, but invalid in
Greece, where the religious form of marriage, alone, is recognized.
It becomes a so-called "limping" marriage. Upon the death of the
Greek, the spouse and the children will get nothing if the question
of status is answered in conformity with Greek law, which in this
case is the lex hereditatis. In Germany, however, since the marriage
was valid, a "limping" succession will arise upon the Greek's death.
The nationality of the decedent is a preliminary question as
well, but there is no doubt that it must be determined according to
the nationality law of each respective country.44
2. Assets belong to the estate
a. general rules
Before applying any law of succession, one must determine
which assets are part of the estate. In general, the estate consists of
assets in which the decedent had a legal interest and whose distribu-
tion is not determined by special rules, i.e., rules other than those of
succession. Generally, the lex hereditatis decides what assets are
part of the estate,45 but the law of succession governs only those
assets which are "left" in the estate by the international law of con-
tracts, property, marital property, or partnerships. 46 There are four
major problems in this context.
b. shares in partnerships and trusts
Upon the death of the owner, the law explicitly provides for the
treatment of shares in companies which are not considered separate
legal entities.47 The conflict rules on succession have to be recon-
ciled with the special conflict rules on companies. Under German
private international law, such associations are subject to the law of
44. For references, see DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 60. For an outline of German na-
tionality law, see DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 61-74.
45. Judgment of Apr. 15, 1959 (BGH), 12 N. J. W. 1317 (1959).
46. Cf. Ferid, VORSCHLAGE, supra note 16, at 33.
47. In Germany, Personalgeselschaften, like the Offene Handels-geselschaft (OHG), or
the BMrgerlich-Rechiliche Gesellschaft. In the United States: Partnerships, trusts, certain
joint tenancies.
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that country where the company has its actual seat of administra-
tion.48 A renvoi by that law will be accepted. 49 Regardless of special
provisions in the charter of the company, as a general rule, the law
governing the partnership determines what assets will go to the
heirs. This law also determines the procedure by which these assets
will be separated from the common assets of the partners. But the
lex hereditatis determines the heirs or beneficiaries who will succeed
to the partnership assets distributed by the law.50
c. joint tenancies
American joint tenancies with the right of survivorship deserve
some special comment. In American law, the acquisition of title by
the surviving tenant is considered an inter vivos transfer; the dece-
dent's share does not fall into his estate.5 ' There is no equivalent to
this in German law, which recognizes different forms of co-owner-
ship, but not the right of survivorship.
If Americans have formed a joint tenancy with regard to real
property situated in Germany, the devolution of this property upon
the death of one of them will be determined by German law as the
lex hereditatis, either because of the renvoi of American law, or be-
cause the German confficts rule for real property calls for applica-
tion of the lex SituS. 52 Since there is no right of survivorship under
German law, the decedent's share in the property falls into his es-
tate, thus becoming subject to the rules of the lex hereditatis.5 3
If the joint tenancy contains movables (usually bank accounts),
the law of the succession and the law of the property may not be
identical. If Americans domiciled in Michigan create a joint bank
account in Munich, the succession is governed by Michigan law, but
the contract with the bank falls under German law as the law of the
bank's seat.54 German courts will prefer the law of the contract 55
48. Coester-Waltjen, German Conflict Rules and the Multinational Enterprise, 6 GA. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 197 (1976).
49. KE EL, supra note 9, at 270. A partnership, which has its place of business in the
United States but is incorporated in Germany, will be governed by German law due to the
renvoi of the American law.
50. Fetid, VORSCHLXGE, supra note 16, at 38.
51. In re Harris Estate, 169 Cal. 725, 147 P. 967 (1915).
52. DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 96.
53. Feid, Die Bedeutung einer '7oint tenancyfr deutsches Nachlassvermi'gen un-
beweglicher und beweglicher Art bei Erbfdllen nach Amerikanern, DEUTSCHE NOTAR-ZEIT-
SCHRIFT [D. NOT. Z.] 517, 521 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Ferid].
54. Id.
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and will therefore hold the joint tenancy invalid. If Germans create
a joint tenancy in a New York bank account, however, New York
law will control. Accordingly, the courts will recognize the right of
survivorship; the account is not part of the decedent's estate. 56
d donatio mortis causa
The classical device to escape rules of succession is the donatio
mortis causa, the problem of which is well illustrated by the re-
ported "will" of a decedent: "And so, being of sound mind and
understanding, I gave away every damn penny I had before I
died." 57
What has been given away validly by the decedent while he or
she lived, of course, can no longer be bestowed upon heirs or benefi-
ciaries. Usually, the laws of the American states recognize the dona-
tio morhis causa as a property transfer inter vivos, the validity of
which is not governed by the law of succession. In Germany, the
views are divided. In order to ascertain the pertinent system of law,
a choice has to be made among (1) the law of the succession, (2) the
law governing gifts inter vivos and bank accounts, and (3) the law
governing the contract with the bank.
If the transaction is classified as an inter vivos transfer, German
courts will apply the law which generally governs donations, i.e., the
donor's domiciliary58 or national law,59 except where the gift is a
bank account, in which case the courts prefer the law of the contract,
which is the law of the bank's seat.60
If the donation is classified as having been made mortis causa,
the prevailing view is that questions as to its validity and effect must
55. Judgment of Apr. 15, 1959 (BGH), 12 N. J. W. 1317 (1959). According to Ferid,
supra note 53, the same result will be reached in applying American law as the lex
hereditatis. Joint tenancy statutes have no effect beyond the state borders so that they can-
not be applied in Germany. Kindler v. Kindler, 169 Neb. 15, 98 N.W.2d 881 (1959).
56. Judgment of Apr. 15, 1959 (BGH), 12 N. J. W. 1317 (1959); judgment of June 10,
1968 (BGH), WM 1170, 1172 (1968). The classification of joint bank acounts (Totten trusts)
as a transaction inter vivos is criticized by Knauer, in Annot., 25 RABELS Z. 318, 332 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Knauer].
57. G. KEGEL, ZUR SCHENKUNG VON TODES WEGEN 30 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
KEGEL, ZUR SCHENKUNG].
58. Judgment of June 24, 1964 (Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/M.), supra note 26, at
IPRspr. no. 37 (1964/1965); FERID, supra note 23, at no. 6-86.
59. It seems doubtful that German courts would permit a choice of law by the donor.
However, there is some authority favoring the parties' autonomy in this respect. See KEGEL,
ZUR SCHENKUNG, supra note 57, at 457.
60. See supra note 56.
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be decided in accordance with the lex hereditatis, i.e., the national
law of the donor at the time of his death.61 Since the donation is to
take effect upon the death of the donor, the same law should govern
the succession and transactions which were intended solely to cir-
cumvent the substantive rules of succession. Some writers, on the
other hand, argue in favor of the national law of the donor at the
time the gift was delivered,62 at least insofar as the validity of the
donation is concerned.
It appears, therefore, that it is of crucial importance to deter-
mine whether the gift is to be classified as inter vivos or mortis
causa. This classification will be made in congruence with the
German lexfori,63 although it would be more consistent to have this
question, too, decided by the lex hereditatis.64
e. marital property
Just as there is a provision in German law to determine the lex
hereditatis, there is a provision that determines which system of law
should govern all questions of marital property. According to arti-
cle 15 EGBGB and the case law, this is the national law of the hus-
band at the time of the consummation of the marriage.65 This law is
called the "law of the marital property."
The law governing marital property will not be affected by a
subsequent change of nationality. It is immutable. Where this law
is applied, therefore, the rules of more than one legal system may
govern the succession on the one hand and martial property on the
other. Since the domestic rules on succession and marital property
61. Judgment of Sept. 20, 1951 (BGH), IPRspr.,supra note 26, at no. 111 (1950/1951);
judgment of Apr. 15, 1959, supra note 55; DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 165.
62. Kegel, Die Schenkung Yon Todes wegen ia deutschen internationalen Privatrecht, in
II FESTSCHRIFT ZEPOS 313, 336 (1973) [hereinafter cited as II FESTSCHRIFT ZEPOS]; T.
SCREUERMANN, STATUTENWECHSEL IM INTERNATIONALEN ERBRECHT 114 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SCHEUERMANN].
63. Other views prefer the lex causae, be it the national law of the donor at the time of
the transaction [SCHEUERMANN, supra note 62, at 115] or a combination of all laws possibly
applicable [KEGEL, supra note 9, at 457]; II FESTSCHRIFr ZEPOS, supra note 62, at 332
(1973).
64. Cf. SCHEUERMANN, supra note 62, at 115.
65. Judgment of Oct. 18, 1968 (BGH), 22 N. J. W. 369 (1969). A renvoi will be
respected. There are considerable doubts about the constitutionality of art. 15 and similar
provisions of the EGBGB. Cf. for instance, arts. 17 and 19, on the constitutionally guaran-
teed equality of sexes. While these doubts are shared by higher courts, the prevailing view
considers art. 15 EGBGB the applicable law. For references see PALANDT/HELDRICH,
supra note 9, art. 15 EGBGB n.2; judgment of July 9, 1980 (BGH), IPRax, supra note 6, at
23 (1981).
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are designed to complement each other but differ greatly from coun-
try to country, their conjunction causes one of the most difficult
problems in German conflicts law.66 This dualism of the law of
marital property and succession is also well known in the United
States, particularly in those states with a community property
system.
As a general principle, the law of the marital property deter-
mines what assets are not part of the estate, subject to marital prop-
erty rules upon the death of a spouse. Only those assets which are
not distributed by the marital property rules of this law are part of
the decedent's estate. The law of the succession determines how
what is left must be distributed.67
The classification of statutes which reserve parts of the dece-
dent's property for his surviving spouse involves a determination of
whether a given statute is concerned with the dissolution of the mar-
ital property rules or with inheritance claims of the surviving
spouse. The problem of classification, which has to be solved ac-
cording to the German lexfori,68 arises in reference to what German
or foreign substantive law might be applicable under German con-
flicts rules. As an example, we shall consider section 1371 BGB and
sections 201 and 201.5 of the California Probate Code.
Under German law, the surviving spouse is doubly bestowed;
he takes one part as marital property and the other part by way of
succession. The most disputed provision, section 13711 BGB, 69 bor-
ders on both areas of the law. In case of intestacy, in lieu of the
surviving spouse receiving an adjustment claim amounting to one-
66. I cannot share the hope that Graue expresses in his article, The Rights of Surviving
Spouses Under Private International Law, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 164, 194 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Graue], that the problem is fading away because tendencies in substantive law con-
fine the marital property regime to the duration of the marriage. The problem would be
solved, however, if the proposal of the "Deutscher Rat fir IPR" would be adopted by the
legislature. The law of the marital property should be mutable and govern all questions of
succession even if the decedent was married at the time of his death. VORSCHLAGE, supra
note 5, at 1, 6 et seq.
67. FERID, supra note 23, at no. 8-128; Neuhaus, Miszelle-Postmortaler Wechsel des
G6itersatuts?, 32 RABELS Z. 542, 544 (1968).
68. FERID, supra note 23, at no. 9-39; PALANDT/HELDRICH, supra note 9, at n.9 pre-
ceding art. 7 EGBGB.
69. The German "community of gains" or "community of surplus" is explained and
the statute reported in English by Graue, supra note 66, at 185 et seq. For the classification
problem, see Graue, at 188, and the exhaustive discussion in Gamillscheg/Lorenz, Die
Bewaltigung des § 1371 BGB durch das IPR, in VORSCHLAGE, supra note 5, at 65-82 [herein-
after cited as Gamillscheg/Lorenz, VORSCHLGE].
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half of the savings acquired by both partners in the course of their
marriage, he is entitled to an augmentation of this inheritance claim
by one-quarter of the estate. Some classify this statutory portion of
section 1371 1 BGB as a real part of the marital property; others see
it as an inheritance right.70
The view which seems to prevail, however, holds section 1371 1
applicable only if German law governs both marital property and
succession,7' since elements of both marital property and succession
are inextricably woven into this provision. This means that German
courts should not apply section 1371 I BGB where the marital prop-
erty is governed by German law, but where the applicable succes-
sion law is foreign. In this case, the share of the surviving spouse
under foreign succession law will not be automatically augmented.
But if the deceased spouse has in fact made a surplus (excess over
the amount of property he owned at the beginning of the marriage)
during the marriage, the survivor will be compensated by an award
of one-half of such gains under German marital property law.72 As
a result, American courts may ignore section 1371 I BGB, unless
German law is applicable to both marital property and succession.
This might happen if the real property of persons domiciled in the
United States is situated in Germany, since American conffict rules
prefer the les situs regardless of the marital property or succession
context.73
As another example, several German courts have had to deal
with sections 201 and 201.5 of the California Probate Code. Ac-
cording to section 201, the surviving spouse takes one-half of the
community property forthwith; the other half is subject to the testa-
mentary disposition of the decedent, but in the absence of such dis-
position, the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Section 201.5
extends this rule to property acquired during marriage, but while
the spouses were not yet subject to California law. The effect given
70. Gamillscheg/Lorenz, VORSCHLAGE, supra note 69.
71. Id.
72. Graue, supra note 66, at 189.
73. DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 186. But if the American court adopted the classifica-
tion of the lex rei sitae, the result could be different. In the judgment of Mar. 30, 1973
(Landgericht Wiesbaden), FAM. R. Z. 657 (1973), the compensation claim of the American
husband was classified as "movable," though the only asset acquired by the wife was real
property in Germany. The court rejected the husband's claim, for Indiana law does not
grant such compensation (art. 15 EGBGB). This decision concerned a divorce case, but the
classification issue is the same. For a criticism see Jayme, supra note 33, at 105.
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these provisions by American tribunals74 will not be automatically
adopted by German courts. In applying German law, they have to
consider, however, the system and context of the California Probate
Code.75 The first half of the community property, which goes di-
rectly to the surviving spouse under section 201, is clearly part of the
marital property regime. The acquisition by the surviving spouse of
the first half under section 201.576 and of the second half under both
provisions, where there is no testament to the contrary, has been
classified under the marital property rule, but the prevailing view
correctly considers it a matter of succession. 77
The posture of German law may be summarized with the aid of
two hypothetical cases:
An American husband who marries in Germany while domi-
ciled there dies intestate with his last domicile in California. His
estate consists of a bank account in Munich, the value of which is
$100,000. The money was acquired while he was still domiciled in
Germany. Of this amount, $80,000 would be, under California law,
quasi-community property of the spouses. How would a German
court decide? The law governing the marital property would be
German law, but the law of the succession would be that of Califor-
nia. As a preliminary question, therefore, the marital property issue
has to be solved. Article 1371 I BGB cannot be applied since the
law of succession is not German. But the widow may have an ad-
justment claim against the heirs if the husband has accumulated
savings during the marriage. The whole bank account, however, is
part of the decedent's estate, which would be distributed according
to California law. Section 201.5 of the California Probate Code, as
a rule of succession, gives both halves of the quasi-community prop-
erty to the surviving spouse. The remaining $20,000 is quasi-sepa-
74. Graue, supra note 66, at 193.
75. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/179.
76. The general rule that the classification has to be made according to the German lex
fori receives special meaning. From an American point of view §§ 201 and 201.5 may, with
regard to one half of the community property, have to be treated alike. However, the pecu-
liarities of the German conflict rule on marital property require a different solution. In cases
where art. 15 EGBGB refers to California law, it would be almost always § 201 and not
§ 201.5. Section 201.5 can be classified as a rule of succession, since the property affected
has in reality never been community property. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/181
et seq.
77. Judgment of Sept. 10, 1959 (Oberlandesgericht Celle), IPRspr. supra note 26, at no.
148 (1958/1959). FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/182 refers to the unpublished de-
cisions of the Amtsgericht Manchen.
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rate property and is distributed in accordance with section 221 of the
California Probate Code.
The converse legal situation may be illustrated by the following
case. An American, domiciled in California, marries a German and
dies with his last domicile in Germany. The bank account in Mu-
nich remains the same. The money in the account was acquired in
California but thereafter was transferred to the Munich account.
The law of the marital property is California law. The succession,
on the other hand, is governed by German law by virtue of the
renvoi in the California law. The widow will immediately take one-
half of the community property ($40,000) under section 201 of the
California Probate Code. The remaining $60,000 is part of the es-
tate. German law, as the law of the succession, will give the widow
a share under section 1931 BGB. The size of the share is dependent
upon the existence of descendants or other relatives entitled to a
share in the estate. It should be noted, however, that the widow
takes a share of the entire remaining estate, without any differentia-
tion between separate or community property, which is unknown to
German law. As in the foregoing example, the share will not be
augmented by the application of section 1371 I BGB, which is appli-
cable only if German law governs both marital property and
succession.
One of the greatest difficulties in the fields of marital property
and succession is that different conffict rules applicable to each may
lead to different substantive laws, and the close connection between
the substantive rules in both fields may thereby be weakened. Some
countries permit the surviving spouse to take a portion of the mari-
tal property while ignoring him in their law of succession. The laws
of others furnish the surviving spouse with a share of the estate but
refuse him any claims upon the marital property after the termina-
tion of the marriage. In extreme cases, the combination of two legal
systems can lead to great injustice: either the surviving spouse gets
nothing, though he or she would have taken a share under each of
the internal laws, or he gets much more than provided for by either
law.78
German approaches to this inequity take two forms. Since the
problem lies in the area of private international law, one approach is
to utilize this law. The other remedy is to change the applicable
substantive laws in order to reach some balance.
78. Graue, supra note 66, at 181.
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In particular, on the level of private international law, the
whole issue may be left to one of the confficting systems, either the
law of the succession or that of the marital property.79 An ingenious
solution was articulated by the Bayerisches Oberstes Landesger-
icht.80 A Lithuanian citizen, who had emigrated in 1949 to Califor-
nia and married there in 1960, died some year later. At the time of
his death he was a naturalized United States citizens, but his nation-
ality at the time of his marriage was not clear. The court simply
declared the law of the marital property to be mutable (law affecting
such property becomes the law of the new nationality) for the pur-
poses of that case and thereby applied section 201.5 of the Califor-
nia Probate Code, which was effective retroactively from the time of
the consummation of marriage. Thus, the law of the succession and
of the marital property were identical. Unfortunately, this solution
works only in the exceptional case where the new law of the marital
property is given retroactive effect. 8'
In respect to substantive law, some writers would like to see the
substantive rules of marital property of the lex hereditatis incorpo-
rated into its rules of succession.8 2 Others would prefer the converse
solution, namely the incorporation of the succession rules of the law
which governs the marital property into the rules of marital prop-
erty.83 Finally, it has been proposed that both substantive laws be
applied cumulatively, whereby the surviving spouse would take
either the combined total of the two laws (maximum limit) or the
higher amount of the two laws (minimum limit).8 4
There is no prevailing view on how to accomplish satisfactory
results. Some adaptive device must be found in any future case in
79. Law of succession, NEUHAUS, supra note 32, at 131; Mailler-Freienfels, Zur kolli-
sionsrechtlichen Abgrenzung Yon Eheguterrecht und Erbrecht, in VORSCHLAGE, supra note 5,
at 42, 53; 7 SOERGEL/KEGEL, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, art. 15, n.10 (10th ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as SOERGEL/KEGEL]. If one of the laws has a community property regime
inter vivos, only this law should determine the distribution upon death. If one of the laws
has a community property regime mortis causa, the law of succession should govern
exclusively.
80. Judgment of Mar. 31, 1966 (Bayrisches Oberstes Landesgericht), ENTSCHEID-
UNGEN DES BAYRISCHEN OBERSTEN LANDESGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BAY. OB. L. G. Z.]
115, 125 (1966).
81. KEGEL, supra note 9, at 152.
82. M. WOLFF, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT DEUTSCHLANDS 59 (3d ed. 1954)
[hereinafter cited as WOLFF].
83. STAUDINGER/GAMILLSCHEG art. 15, note 361.
84. Id., n.364.
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order to achieve a just distribution of the estate. The rest depends
on the inventiveness of the judge.
II. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
A. Issues Governed by the Lex Hereditatis
The lex hereditatis determines all main questions of inheri-
tance: the succession to the estate in the absence of a will, the capac-
ity to receive as heir, the acquisition of title to the estate, 85 and the
procedure to renounce it. Since the unilateral disclaimer is un-
known with respect to intestate succession in most American states,
the effect of the German disclaimer is construed as if American law
governed the succession. According to one view the disclaimer has
the same effect as under German law.86 Another view considers it a
contractual transfer of a position acquired by succession.87 The cor-
rect solution will depend on whether an administration of the estate
takes place in the United States.88 If it does not, the beneficiary
cannot disclaim his position but may only transfer it contractually.89
The law of succession governs the legal relations among the
beneficiaries, 90 their liability for debts of the decedent or of the es-
tate,9' and contracts among the beneficiaries regarding the distribu-
tion of the assets.92
Finally, the law of succession governs the administration of the
estate.93 The question of which law in particular is the lex
85. The beneficiaries under American succession statutes are considered "heirs" in the
German meaning of this notion for the purposes of estates situated in Germany, whether an
administration takes place in the United States or not. IPG, supra note 9, at 820, no. 61
(1965/1966).
86. Kthlewein, Die Erbscheinserteilung nach Ausschlagung amerikanischer Erben, 16
N. J. W. 142 (1963).
87. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/174.
88. DROBRNIG, supra note 1, at 163.
89. The same applies where the disclaimer is limited to certain assets of the estate, as
for example, the assets situated in Germany. Since such partial disclaimer will not be admit-
ted in Germany, it has to be interpreted as a contractual relinquishment by release between
the heirs. IPG, supra note 9, at 524, no. 51 (1965/1966).
90. Judgment of June 1, 1968, WM 1170, 1171 (1968). See also DROBNIG, supra note
1, at 193 for more information. The law of succession, however, does not determine the
legal title of the heirs concerning single assets. Ferid, VORSCHLXGE, supra note 16, at 34.
91. But see art. 24 II EGBGB; DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 191; IPG, supra note 9, at
350, no. 36 (1971). The German heir of a California decedent's estate administered in Cali-
fornia is not personally liable for the debts, as he would be under German law.
92. IPG, supra note 9, at 876, no. 73 (1965/1966).
93. DRORNIG, supra note 1, at 183. To avoid the complications caused by foreign
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hereditatis in German-American succession cases will be discussed
separately.
B. Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children Under German Law
Inheritance claims of illegitimate children differ from those of
legitimate descendants under German law. While the ordinary
claim of the illegitimate child against the estate is clearly subject to
the law of succession, the provisions of sections 1934(d) and (e)
BGB, which give the illegitimate child a claim against the father
during his lifetime, are not applicable here. Some consider this
claim a matter of maintenance, because the portion paid out to the
illegitimate child is calculated according to alimony standards and
replaces the inheritance rights of the child. 94 Consequently, the ap-
plicable law would be the national law of the mother at the time of
the child's birth or the law of the child's habitual residence. 95
Others would rather apply the national law of the father as the law
which governs the relations between father and illegitimate child in
general. 96 The majority view, however, prefers the law of
succession. 97
If, before leaving Germany, a German father pays out to his
illegitimate child the portion required by section 1934(d) BGB and
later dies as an American citizen domiciled in a state whose law
gives illegitimate and legitimate children equal shares in the estate
of their father, three possibilities exist:
1. Upon the death of his father, the illegitimate child ac-
quires no share of the estate (the effect of section 1934(e)
BGB is extended to foreign succession law); or
2. In order to receive the statutory share, the child has to
pay back the portion already received; or
3. The child keeps the portion already received and takes,
in addition, his statutory share under American law.
administration systems in Germany, Fetid has proposed to apply the lexfori to matters of
administration. This proposal was rejected by KEGEL, supra note 9, at 459.
94. PALANDT/HELDRICH, supra note 9, art. 24 EGBGB, n.3.
95. Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Obligations to Support Minor Chil-
dren of Oct. 3-4, 1956, effective Jan. 1, 1962, BGBI 1 1012 (1961); BGBI 1116 (1962).
96. K. SIEHR, AUSWIRKUNGEN DES NICHTEHELICHENGESETZES AUF DAS INTERNATIO-
NALE PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHT 146 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SIEHR]; R. JOCHEM,
DAS ERBRECHT DES NICHTEHELICHEN KINDES NACH DEUTSCHEM RECHT BEI
SACHVERHALTEN MIT AUSL;.NDERBEROHRUNG 69 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JOCHEM].
97. SOERGEL/KEGEL, supra note 79, at nn.22(a) and 72 preceding art. 24.
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As one might expect, views are divided on this issue,98 and
there are no judicial guidelines.99
C Rules of Escheat
Whether an escheat of the estate will occur is determined by the
law of succession. The crucial question is which state should possess
the estate. Under German law, the state whose law governs the suc-
cession will apply. m°° The enforcement of this position, where Ger-
man law governs assets situated abroad, depends on the lex situs.10'
III. WILLS AND CONTRACTS OF INHERITANCE
A. Choice of Law by the Testator
Choice of law clauses in wills, which may be conclusively rec-
ognized in some states in America, do not bind a German court in
its choice of the applicable law. The arguments in favor of party
autonomy (choice of law by the parties) in the field of succession
law 10 2 have been rejected by the Federal Supreme Court and the
majority of scholars, 0 3 so that at least on this issue the law is settled.
The reference of the testator to a certain law may be used, however,
as an aid in the construction of the will. 104
The position of foreign private international law on party au-
98. According to SIEHR, supra note 96, and PALANDT/HELDRICH, supra note 9, art. 24,
n.3, the anticipated share will not be affected by a subsequent change of the applicable law.
A different result has to be reached by those who want the law of succession to govern the
anticipated claim, that is, the national law at the time of death. SOERGEL/KEGEL, supra
note 97.
99. A comparable problem may arise if the child is not German and dies before his
father. German law denies inheritance claims of the father if he had to compensate the
child's anticipated claim during its lifetime (§ 1934(e) BGB). Will he take a share under the
foreign law of succession? SIEHR, supra note 97, at 109.
100. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/189; IPG, supra note 9, at 880, no.78
(1967/1968).
101. In the American states, the conflict rules seem to refer to the lex situs, so that the
states are likely to claim the estate situated within their borders even if it is governed by
German succession law. Cf. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/119. On the other
hand, it has been argued that California law will not insist on its right if another country
considers the estate as situated there. IPG, supra note 9, at no. 78 (1967/1968).
102. D6lle, Die Rechiswahl im internationalen Erbrecht, 30 RABELS Z. 205 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Dolle]. Cf. Mller, Miszelle-Die Rechtrwahlim internationalen Erbrecht, 31
RABELS Z. 337 (1967). For a limited freedom of choice, see SCHEUERMANN, supra note 62,
at 137.
103. Judgment of Mar. 29, 1972 (BGH), IPG, supra note 9, at 310, no. 32 (1972); Feid,
VORSCHLAGE, supra note 16, at 93-104.
104. Judgment of Mar. 29, 1972 (BGH), supra note 103; D(11e, supra note 102, at 205,
211,216.
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tonomy must be examined with reference to the problem of
renvoi.105 For example, if an American decedent, who was origi-
nally a Michigan citizen, later acquired voluntary domicile in Ger-
many and made a will declaring the law of Michigan applicable for
the disposition of his personal property, a German court would dis-
regard the choice of law clause within the framework of German
conflicts law and would follow the reference of articles 24 and 25
EGBGB to the national law of the decedent, in this case Michigan
law. That law, which contains a choice of law clause (section 702.44
of the Michigan Probate Code), would in turn refer back to German
law as the law of the testator's last domicile. As a consequence, the
German court would have to respect the choice of law clause within
the framework of Michigan conflicts law and thereby apply Michi-
gan law as the law of the succession with regard to movables.
B. The Formal Validity of Wills
The formal validity of wills is governed by a variety of laws, in
accordance with the Hague Convention of 1961,I °6 which replaces
article 11 EGBGB. The policy of the Convention is to validate wills
as far as possible. 10 7 It applies to American decedents although the
United States is not a party to the Convention. Both the validity of
a will itself and the revocation of a prior will by testament are deter-
mined by the rules of the Convention.10 8
C. The Essential Validity and Effects of a Will
1. The applicable law in general
The lex hereditatis also determines the validity and effect of
wills. The will, however, may have been drawn up many years
before the death of the testator. A change in nationality may have
brought about a change of the relevant lex hereditatis in the
meantime. In order to protect the expectations of the testator at the
105. Judgment of May 21, 1959 (Landgericht Bochum), IPRspr., supra note 26, at no.
147 (1958/1959); IPG, supra note 9, at 838, no. 74 (1967/1968). The problem is overlooked
in the judgment of Mar. 29, 1972 (BGH), supra note 104. See also Coester, JURISTISCHE
ARBEITSBLATrER 351, 353 (1979).
106. Hague Convention on the Confficts of Laws Relating to the Form of Testamen-
tary Dispositions of 1961, effective Jan. 1, 1966, BGBI I 1145 (1965).
107. For a discussion of the rules in particular, see DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 166.
108. Art. 2 of the Convention, supra note 106. A revocation other than by testament is
not governed by the Convention; the form will be determined by art. 11 EGBGB. PA-
LANDT/HELDRICH, app. arts. 24-26 EGBGB, annot. art. 2.
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time of making of the will, it has been proposed that the law which
would have governed the succession at that time should determine
the validity of the will, leaving only the effect of the will to be deter-
mined by the law of succession at the time of death. 10 9 Under the
prevailing view, however, the latter view is applicable to both valid-
ity and effect. 110 Article 24 III EGBGB makes an exception with
regard to the capacity to make a will.'"
2. Issues governed by the lex hereditatis
In particular, the law of succession will determine matters relat-
ing to the forced shares of surviving spouse and relatives,"12 the right
of a testator to disinherit family members," 3 the validity and effect
of conditional or life estates,' 14 the nomination of executors, 115 and
the revocation of wills.116
3. Construction
Generally, a will is to be construed according to the law of suc-
cession, 117 even if the testator had another law in mind when mak-
ing the will. Thus, "American" wills have to be construed according
to German rules of construction if German law governs the succes-
sion. But since under German Law the "presumed intent" of the
testator serves as a leading guideline for construction, some concepts
of American law may influence a court's construction," 8 although
they will be adapted and "translated" into the concepts and institu-
tions of German law.
109. KEGEL, supra note 9, at 460.
110. PALANDT/HELDRICH, art. 24, n.3; SCHEUERMANN, supra note 62, at 76 et seq.
111. The exception is limited to foreign testators who subsequently acquire the Ger-
man nationality. Cf. DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 167.
112. Judgment of August 26, 1963 (Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf), IPRspr., supra note
26, at no. 151 (1962/1963).
113. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1911 (Reichsgericht), JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 22
(1912). German public policy is not violated if the applicable law provides for no forced
shares at all.
114. Judgment of Dec. 3, 1956 (Oberlandesgericht Celle), FAM. R. Z. 273 (1957).
115. Judgment of Sept. 25, 1958 (Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/M.), IPRspr., supra
note 26, at no. 145 (1958/1959).
116. Judgment of Feb. 29, 1952 (Oberlandesgericht Neustadt), IPRspr., supra note 26,
at no. 234 (1952/1953).
117. IPG, supra note 9, at 328, no. 33 (1972).
118. Gottheiner, Anpassungs- und Umdeutungsprobleme bei deutsch-englischen Erbfdl-
len (Thesis Tubingen 1955).
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4. "American" wills in German law
a. The classification of benedciaries
Under German law, an heir is any person who takes the whole
estate or an undivided fraction thereof. A person who takes only
specifically designated assets or items of property does not qualify as
an heir. The distinction is important in German law for purposes of
taxation or a certificate of inheritance.
Accordingly, specific or general legacies in "American" testa-
ments do not make the beneficiary an heir under German law. But
the residuary legatees are considered heirs regardless of whether or
not an administrator first has possession of or title to the estate."19
Beneficiaries of an estate upon absolute limitation (like life estates)
will be considered provisional heirs and the remaindermen will be
reversionary heirs. 120 Estates upon conditional limitation can be up-
held without change. Since these kinds of legacies are not common
in German wills, the greatest difficulties lie in the exact formulation
of the certificate of inheritance. 12'
D. Trusts
The concept of a trust, although not recognized in Germany, is
not repugnant to German law like the lex situs 122 and will be consid-
ered valid. 23 A problem of transposition arises as to the classifica-
tion of the persons affected by the trust. A trustee who is not a
beneficiary at the same time does not qualify as an heir, but rather
as an executor under section 2209 BGB.124 His powers extend to
property situated in Germany, as well as elsewhere. 25 The benefi-
ciaries of the trust may qualify as provisional or reversionary heirs
or as creditors of the estate. 26 The same rules apply to the trustee
119. This result is widely undisputed. Cf. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/212
and DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 171.
120. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/201, 204.
121. See the examples given by FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/201 et seq.
122. See supra text accompanying note 51.
123. Gottheiner, Zur.4nwendung englischen Erbrechts auf Nach asse in Deutschland, 21
RABELS Z. 36 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Gottheiner].
124. FEUID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/199 and 207; DROBNIG, supra note 1, at
189.
125. Judgment of May 2, 1972 (Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt/M.), IPRspr., supra note
26, at no. 125 (1972).
126. Id.
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who is a beneficiary at the same time. 127 These rules must be modi-
fied with regard to charitable or discretionary trusts on a case-by-
case basis. 28
E. Powers of Appointment
With regard to powers of appointment created by a will, Ger-
man and American conflict rules agree in applying the law of suc-
cession to determine their validity and effect.129 If the lex hereditatis
is German, problems of transposition arise since German law in
general does not acknowledge such powers. This will not be the
case, however, if the power is limited to specified items of property,
where there is a comparable institution in German law.' 30 But if the
donee is empowered to dispose of the entire estate or an undivided
fraction of it, i.e., to appoint legatees who are to be classified as heirs
under German law, the situation becomes complicated. The institu-
tion of provisionary or reversionary heirship can be applied if the
donee is the beneficiary of a life estate and has a testamentary power
to appoint the remainderman, but in default of such appointment a
remainderman is designated by the donor-testator.' 3' If the donee
has a general power of appointment exercisable inter vivos, he will
be considered an heir. 132 If the power is exercisable by testament
alone, the general power cannot be upheld under German law. 33
In case of a special power, its validity will depend on whether
the possible appointees are few in number; the final choice is gener-
ally predetermined by the testator, leaving the donee little or no
discretion. 34
F Joint and Mutual Wills
In general, the lex hereditatis governs joint and mutual wills as
well as individual ones, subject to the qualifications discussed
below.
127. Id. The problem seems to have been overlooked in IPG, supra note 9, at 774, no.
66 (1965/1966).
128. Gottheiner, supra note 124, at 172.
129. For a discussion of powers of appointment in a civil law sphere, see Lipstein, in II
FESTSCHRIFT FOR WENGLER 431-441 (1973).
130. §§ 2151, 2153 BGB.
131. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/210; IPG, supra note 9, at 831, no. 74
(1967/1968).
132. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/210; Gottheiner, upra note 123, at 168.
133. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/210.
134. Id.
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1. Cumulation of the national laws
If the national laws of the testators differ, both laws have to be
applied, each with regard to the disposition of its appropriate part of
the will. 35 Should the result be that one of the testators is not
bound by the testamentary provisions, the reciprocal dispositions of
the other will also lose their binding effect.' 36 Under German sub-
stantive law, there is a presumption in this case that the testator
would not have made the will at all, so the disposition is invalid in
its entirety.
2. Formal validity
Two problems must be analyzed separately: one is whether
persons may will jointly in a single document, and the other is
whether their dispositions are mutually dependent and preclude
unilateral revocation. The first question relates to the form of wills,
the second to the effect of joint and mutual dispositions. The formal
requirements are determined by article 4 of the Hague Convention
of 1961. Thus, if the national law of the testators forbids joint wills
on formal grounds, the will may nevertheless be valid under the law
of some other country recognized by the Convention, such as that of
the nation where the will was made. As in the case of Italy, how-
ever, a country may forbid mutual wills for reasons of public policy.
In this case, the joint and mutual will of a national of that country is
void wherever made. 137
3. Effect
As a rule the German courts apply the national law of the testa-
tors at the time of death, 38 but the prevailing view in the legal liter-
ature argues in favor of the national law at the time of the creation
of the will.' 39 Neither theory can resolve all problems: If nationals
of the Netherlands, where the law forbids joint wills on formal
grounds, make a joint and mutual will in Germany, the will is for-
mally valid. Its effect has to be determined according to Dutch law,
the national law of the testators. Understandably, Dutch law does
not arrange for a binding effect. The result for German courts will
135. FERID, supra note 23, at no. 8-129.
136. FER1D/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/193.
137. KEGEL, supra note 9, at 461; DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 167.
138. Neuhaus/Gtandisch, supra note 26, at 551-554.
139. KEGEL, supra note 9, at 461; Ferid, VORSCHLGE, supra note 16, at 137.
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be a non-binding mutual will-an institution not known in either of
the interested countries."4
4. German-American relations
a. United States law governing succession
If German courts have to apply the law of an American state,
they look for a separate contract to create or refrain from revoking a
will in order to determine the binding effect of joint and mutual
wills.' 4 1 The argument that such contracts violate German public
policy 142 is correctly rejected by the majority of legal scholars.143 In
accordance with the prevailing view in the United States, German
courts will not assume an implied contract merely because the testa-
tors have made a joint and mutual will. 144
If German spouses, who have made a mutual will in Germany,
become United States citizens domiciled in New York, and the sur-
viving spouse revokes his previous disposition by a new will, the
remedies of the beneficiaries under the mutual will have to be deter-
mined according to the laws of New York. 14 5 There seems to be no
way to secure the operation of German law, as has been
proposed. 46
b. German law governing the succession
If an American couple makes a mutual will in New York, each
marital partner leaving everything to the other and providing for the
children to take the remainder after the death of the survivor, and
after the death of the man, the wife married a German, acquires
German nationality, and makes a will exclusively in favor of her
new husband, how can the children'enforce the rights under the mu-
tual will after the death of their mother? Those courts applying the
national law of the decedent at the time of death have to apply Ger-
man law, which holds the mutual will binding and the second will
void. Those courts invoking the national law at the time of the crea-
140. SCHEUERMANN, supra note 62, at 104. For a critical view, see G. KEGEL, FEST-
SCHRIFT FOR JAHRREIS 158 (1964).
141. IPG, supra note 9, at 768, no. 71 (1967/1968).
142. M. WOLFF, DAS IPR DEUTSCHLANDS 234 (3d ed. 1954), quoting § 2302 BGB.
143. SCHEUERMANN, supra note 62, at 112.
144. IPG, supra note 9, at 768, no. 71 (1967/1968).
145. Neuhaus/Gilndisch, supra note 26, at 573.
146. IPG, supra note 9, at 817, no. 68 (1965/1966); SCHEUERMANN, supra note 62, at
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tion of the instrument will apply New York law, which provides that
the violation of a contract not to revoke a will does not make a sec-
ond revoking will invalid. In such a case, the court will impose Ger-
man law upon the mutual will made in New York. 147
G. Inheritance Agreements and Release of Expectancy
Inheritance agreements (Erbvertrage) are unknown to Ameri-
can law, but through the recognition and enforcement of contracts
to make wills, similar results are reached. 148 The contractual release
of expectancy has a counterpart in German law.
1. Form
The formal validity of institutions is provided for not by the
Hague Convention of 1961, but by article 11 EGBGB. Hence, the
law of succession of the place of creation governs. If a release of
expectancy is contained in an instrument signed by a notary public
in the United States and German law governs the succession, the
release does not fulfill the formal requirements of German law. 149
After ascertaining whether the American and German institutions
are equivalent, the formal validity is approved according to the law
of the place where the release has been executed. 150
2. Effect
With regard to effect, there is again a dispute as to whether the
national law at the time of the decedent's death' 5' or at the time of
creation of the instrument 152 should apply. The latter view seems to
prevail today. However this dispute may be settled, the law of suc-
cession will govern bilateral contracts of inheritance only for that
contracting party who makes dispositions upon his death. 153 If the
parties are of different nationalities, the law of each will apply to his
own dispositions. 154 If there are marriage and inheritance contracts
together in one document, the applicable law is determined by the
classification of the particular provisions and may be that of the
147. SCHEUERMANN, supra note 62, at 113, 114.
148. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/51 and 40/96.
149. FERID, supra note 23, at no. 5-115.
150. IPG, supra note 9, at 809, 818, no. 68 (1965/1966).
151. Fetid, VORSCHLAGE, supra note 16, at 119.
152. KEGEL, supra note 9, at 460.
153. SOERGEL/KEGEL, supra note 79, at nn.35 and 41 preceding art. 24.
154. FERID, supra note 62, at no. 8-129.
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marital property, that of the personal relations of the spouses, or
that of succession. 55
IV. PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION
Finally, problems of probate and administration arise in the
context of international estate cases. First, we shall consider juris-
dictional questions and the effect of American probate court deci-
sions. The second and final point will be the administration of
German-American estates.
A. Probate
1. German probate jurisdiction
Contentious litigation involving decedents' estates poses no
specific problems: international jurisdiction is derived from the
venue requirements. 56 But here we will be concerned rather with
the jurisdiction in all estate-related matters arising in the course of a
non-contentious proceeding. The question as to the jurisdiction of
the courts in this area is hotly disputed.
a. Parallelism ofjurisdiction and applicable law
Americans are familiar with the principle that a court with
proper jurisdiction applies its own law, but the traditional and still
prevailing view in Germany is that German "Probate Courts" have
jurisdiction if and insofar as German law governs the succession. 57
There are, however, some exceptions to this rule, to assure that a
denial of jurisdiction does not lead to a denial of justice. Thus, the
jurisdiction of German courts was affirmed despite the fact that for-
eign law governed succession in the following situations: an appli-
cation to draw up an inventory of the assets of the estate, 58 the
receiving of declarations of acceptance or disclaimer by the heir, 159
the opening of the will after the testator's death, 60 and the appoint-
ment of a curator (custodian) or issuance of other orders to secure
155. Id.
156. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/156.
157. Judgment of Oct. 26, 1967 (BGH), 49 BGHZ 1; DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 173,
174.
158. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1965 (Bayrisches Oberlandesgericht), BAYRISCHE OBER-
LANDESGERICHTSZEITUNG 423, 431 (1965).
159. Id.
160. IPRspr., supra note 26, at no. 202 (1958/1959).
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and protect the estate where the heir is unknown. 161 In addition,
jurisdiction of German courts is given ipsojure with regard to certif-
icates of inheritance and executorship. They may be issued for as-
sets in Germany even if governed by a foreign law of succession.
b. Modern tendencies
It has been argued that in the field of succession substantive
and procedural law are not so closely intertwined as the traditional
view supposes. 62 The jurisdictional restriction of the German
courts to cases which are governed by German law is said to be
intolerable in an age of such high international mobility. 63 From
this point of view jurisdiction is given, provided the case has some
connection with Germany, 164 and discussion focuses rather on the
restrictions for exceptional cases. 165 Although these views may be
converging, they are still far from reconciliation, as can be shown
with respect to the administration of estates.
2. American probate court decisions in Germany
Generally, an American domiciliary probate decree is not nec-
essary for the recognition of the validity of a will. It may, however,
raise a presumption of validity for American or English wills.166 On
the other hand, the view that the period of limitations for claims
against the estate under German law is dependent on a domiciliary
probate decree 67 must be rejected.
Recently, an American decedent with his last domicile in New
York left personal property in New York and Germany. A creditor
filed his claim against the estate with the administator in New York.
The administrator rejected the claim. After a trial, this decision was
affirmed by the New York Surrogate Court in a final probate decree.
161. Judgment of Oct. 26, 1967 (BGH), 49 BGHZ 1, 2.
162. For a criticism of the traditional view, see Dblle, Uber einige Kernprobleme des
internationalen Rechts derfreiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit, 27 RABELS Z. 201, 232 (1962) [herein-
after cited as Dlle]; Neuhaus, Zur internationalen Zustiandigkeit in derfreiwilligen Gericht-
sbarkeit, 25 N. J. W. 1167, 1168 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Neuhaus].
163. Feid, in FESTSCHRiFr COHN 31, 33, 37 (1975).
164. KEGEL, supra note 9, at 463; Heldrich, Fragen der Zustandigkeit der deutschen
Nachlassgerichte, 10 N. J. W. 417 (1967); A. HELDRICH, INTERNATIONALE ZUSTANDIGKEIT
UND ANWENDBARES RECHT 211 (1969).
165. See the discussion and references by Neuhaus, supra note 162, at 1167, 1168.
166. Judgment of June 26, 1975 (Oberlandesgericht Ko1n), FAM. R. Z. 170, 172 (1976).
167. This was the argument of the Landgericht Bonn, quoted in the Oberlandesgericht
Ko1n, supra note 166.
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Then the creditor sued again in Germany with respect to the assets
situated there. A published expert opinion advised the court on
whether the creditor was foreclosed from bringing the second claim
because of res judicata. 68 First, a final probate decree in domicili-
ary proceedings is given universal effect under the law of New York.
Second, such decisions generally warrant the application of the res
judicata doctrine of the United States. Third, this effect extends to
Germany if reciprocity of recognition of judicial decisions is guar-
anteed. After an exhaustive discussion of the court practice in New
York, the reciprocity was recognized. 69 As a result, the creditor's
action was barred in Germany by the decree of the New York Sur-
rogate Court.
B. Administration
1. In general
In contrast to American law, the German law of decedents' es-
tates does not, in general, allow for an administration in the Anglo-
American sense. The German principle provides for self-adminis-
tration by the heirs and self-protection by the creditors. It is not
surprising, therefore, that American-German cases often cause spe-
cial difficulties in the field of administration.
These problems are not likely to be resolved by the adoption of
the new Hague Convention on the International Administration of
Decedents' Estates of 1973.170 This Convention has received harsh
criticism' 7 1 and has little chance of being adopted by a significant
number of countries. 172 In discussing administration problems, one
must distinguish those cases where German law governs the succes-
sion from those which are governed by American law.
168. IPG, supra note 9, at 420, no. 41 (1973).
169. The discussion focused on the Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Rec-
ognition Act.
170. Haager Konferenzfir internationales Privatrecht, 39 RABELS Z. 104 (1975).
171. Lipstein, Das Haager Abkommen uber die internationale Abwicklung Yon Nachis-
sen, 39 RABELS Z. 29 (1975); KEGEL, supra note 9, at 473.
172. For the English text and an introduction to the Convention see Nadelmann, Draft
Convention Concerning the International Administration of Estates of Deceased Persons, 21
AM. J. COMP. L. 139 (1973).
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2. German law governing the succession
a. Intestate succession
If the decedent has left no will, the legal situation is simple: no
administration will take place. An administration ordered in an
American state will be ignored, and the heirs will take their shares
under German law as legal successors to the title of the decedent. 73
b. Testamentary succession
The situation is different with regard to wills only where the
testator has made the will according to American law and has ap-
pointed an executor. German law recognizes the institution of an
executor, but the function of this German executor is the enforce-
ment and fulfillment of special burdens imposed by the testator
rather than the regular administration of the estate.'7 4 Since many
American testators appoint an executor only to avoid the appoint-
ment of an administrator cum testamento annexo by the court, some
scholars would like to see the testamentary appointment under Ger-
man law enforced only if the testator's aim was to confer upon the
administrator duties which exceed the regular duties of an adminis-
trator according to the Anglo-American concept. 75 Other writers
would enforce a testamentary appointment in any case. 176 Insofar
as the appointment of the executor is affirmed in Germany, he has
only the position of an executor as conceived by German law, even
if he administers the estate from his California home together with
assets situated in the United States and possibly governed by United
States law.
3. United States law governing succession
American succession law is difficult to reconcile with German
law, including German procedural rules, which are always applica-
ble as the lexfori.
German lawyers try to cope with the difficulties of administra-
tion through two approaches. The first avoids foreign law by apply-
173. DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 190.
174. Compare the distinction between an executor and a trustee in American law.
THOMPSON ON WILLS 773 (1947).
175. FERID, supra note 23, at no. 9-83; FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/212.
176. KEGEL, supra note 9, at 466; Gottheiner, supra note 124, at 60.
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hmg the lexfori to matters of administration, and the other resorts to
adaption and similar devices.
a. Administration governed by the German lex fori
One proposal would apply the lexfori to all matters of adminis-
tration.'" Thus, the German conflict rule would refer directly to
German law in this respect. But this doctrine is not widely accepted.
The next best solution from this point of view is the application of
the German lexfori by way of renvoi. In this regard, German writ-
ers have discovered a hidden renvoi in the law of the American
states, which is said to refer all questions of administration to the lex
situs, or what is the same in all but a few cases, the lexfori.17 8 This
theory is based on the fact that in the United States, every state
holding assets of the estate may order a separate administration, and
each administration is governed by the respective lexfori. As a re-
sult, regardless of the law governing the succession, German sub-
stantive law would determine the questions of administration in
American-German succession cases. This doctrine is ingenious but
does not reflect the reality of American law. American law is con-
cerned with jurisdictional requirements and does not state separate
rules for the applicable law. There is no question that an adminis-
trator who is appointed by a court in a given state has to act accord-
ing to the law of that state. Hence, the appointment of an executor
justifies the application of the lex situs to matters of administration.
There is no reference to the lex situs independent of such an ap-
pointment. The German theory uses the alleged renvoi to the
German lexfori for the very purpose of avoiding the appointment
of an administrator, which is not necessary under German law. 7 9
Moreover, if American succession law and German rules of ad-
ministration have to be combined, the former has to undergo sub-
stantial modification. 80 But it seems more appropriate to adapt
German rules of procedure as far as possible to the foreign law of
succession, the application of which is ordered by the German con-
flicts rules, rather than change the applicable substantive law for
reasons of procedural convenience.
177. Supra note 96.
178. FERID, supra note 23, at no. 9-21 and 9-80; FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at
40/172 et seq.
179. IPG, spra note 9, at 354, no. 36 (1971).
180. K. FIRSCHING, DEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHE ERBFALLE 127-148 (1965).
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b. Administration governed by American law
The prevailing view is that American law should be applied to
administration. It is, however, disputed among German courts and
legal scholars how the American concept of administration is to be
put into practice in Germany. 181
On the one hand, reconciling the American law of succession
with German procedure is seen as impossible. The transposition of
American institutions into comparable German institutions is possi-
ble only in a few instances. Consequently, this view denies German
courts the power to institute an American-type administration, and
American administrators or executors are not recognized. 182 On the
other hand, the so-called "doctrine of recognition" adopts American
principles of administration and recognizes the powers of appointed
executors and administrators, at least if they have been appointed
by the domiciliary court of the decedent. 8 3 Accordingly, the Amer-
ican administrator or executor is entitled to a certificate under Ger-
man law which spells out his powers under the law of his state of
appointment. 84
The first opinion, that German procedure cannot be combined
with American substantive law of succession, runs counter to the
practice of German courts, which follow the "doctrine of recogni-
tion." The second argument, that the powers of administrators are
limited under United States law to their respective states and there-
fore cannot be extended to Germany, 85 is not valid for domiciliary
administrators. 86 The domiciliary state in the United States will
accept, however, the position of other states which do not recognize
or admit acts of the domicilary administrator, but prefer to institute
an ancillary administration.187 This arrangement among the various
states cannot, however, provide an analagous argument against the
recognition of American administrators in Germany. First, the ten-
dency even within the United States is towards universal succession,
since more and more states allow foreign administrators to sue and
181. Judgment of Mar. 20, 1972 (Kammergericht), IPRspr., supra note 26, at no. 123
(1972).
182. Id.
183. IPG, supra note 9, at 251, no. 32 (1969); IPG 428, no. 41 (1973); Gottheiner, supra
note 124, at 69.
184. Judgment of Apr. 26, 1976 (BGH), 18 Z. F. RVGL. 133, 134 (1977).
185. IPG, supra note 9, at 528, no. 51 (1965/1966).
186. IPG, supra note 9, at 705, no. 61 (1965/1966); IPG 428, no. 41 (1973).
187. This was overlooked by the judgment of Mar. 20, 1972 (Kammergericht), IPRspr.,
supra note 26, at no. 123 (1972).
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to be sued in their courts and let the domiciliary administrator regu-
late the estate with respect to all states where the deceased owned
property at death. 88 Secondly, the reference of German conflict
rules to the American law is unconditional and includes questions of
administration. There is nothing in the German law which prevents
foreign heirs or administrators from bringing actions against the es-
tate for assets in Germany. Finally, the creditors, who are said to be
placed in a disadvantageous position through the recognition of
American administrators, have to protect themselves, as in all other
succession cases. 189 The "doctrine of recognition" view, therefore,
seems to prevail in Germany.
C CertiFcates of Inheritance
The issuance of certificates of inheritance is one of the main
tasks of German courts in succession cases. The certificate is
designed to legitimate the persons who have the title to the estate
and may dispose of it. The certificate is issued upon application of
persons who have a legal interest in its issuance. In succession cases
which are governed by United States law, difficulties arise in the
translation of the legal posture into German legal language and con-
cepts. 90 The distributees or residuary legatees are considered
"heirs" for purposes of the certificate, the law of a particular state of
the United States governs the succession, and the estate is subject to
administration under American law.191
German certificates of inheritance do not represent a final adju-
dication and therefore are not conclusive for American courts, but
they may provide prima facie evidence for the correctness of a par-
ticular interpretation of the German law.192
188. Currie, The Multtqle Personality of the Dead- Executors, Administrators, and the
Conflict of Laws, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 429 (1966).
189. DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 192.
190. FERID/FIRSCHING, supra note 15, at 40/212.
191. IPG, supra note 9, at 709, no. 61 (1965/1966); IPG 252, no. 32 (1969); DROBNIG,
supra note 1, at 179.
192. DROBNIG, supra note 1, at 181.
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